European Issue n°409
Transatlantic Relations after BrexitTransatlantic Relations after Brexit
Abstract:Brexit represents a potentially significant change to the way transatlantic relations have been organized since WWII. The "special relationship" between the United Kingdom and the United States, born out of historic and cultural affinities, has come under strain, since America traditionally relied on Britain as its political and economic entry point into Europe. This paper will explore the new, post-Brexit system of multiple partnerships and alliances that is likely to emerge. While the US will be keen to maintain strong bonds with the UK, it will have no other choice but to reinforce ties with other European Union countries. Over time, a second "special relationship" may develop, as the US pivots towards the Franco-German axis as a key interlocutor for transatlantic relations. Germany has already begun to assume leadership for transatlantic economic and trade issues, having re-emerged as the dominant economic power and key decision-maker in the EU under Chancellor Merkel. Likewise, a noticeable Franco-American rapprochement has occurred since France re-joined NATO in 2009; more recently, France has become the US ally of choice for military cooperation, which will be key for the future evolution of transatlantic security relations. After Brexit, France will be the only major military force in the EU, a nuclear power possessing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, with an experienced army that has intervened in crisis points around the world.
The UK has emphasized that Brexit will not change its strong commitment to European security as a key NATO ally. Nevertheless, after it leaves the EU, Britain will no longer have a seat in the European Council or the Council of Ministers where member states coordinate their national foreign and defense policies. This paper will examine the opportunity that this presents for continental European countries to enhance defense cooperation with the US within the NATO framework, especially following Russian interventionism in Eastern Europe. Because of Brexit, the UK is likely to lose previous influence over institutions relating to the EU's independent external relations (CFSP and CSDP), which means that the US will have to work more closely with the EU on strategic cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty defined foreign affairs and defense as intergovernmental policy areas, thus EU external relations have been limited to a soft security role. The current context of international instability indicates that this may no longer be sufficient, encouraging several EU officials to argue for greater permanent structured cooperation. Brexit has made this possible, since the UK had previously vetoed any such attempts. However, in order to maintain the cohesion of the Western alliance, it is essential that the US, Britain and other non-EU countries be closely associated with the CFSP and CSDP in the future. Even though extensive negotiations will be necessary concerning the implications for NATO, where the US enjoys a dominant position, greater EU defense cooperation represents an opportunity to strengthen NATO and the Western alliance as a whole.
The origins of transatlantic relations go back to the 18th century at the time of the American War of Independence. As George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, led a desperate attempt to free the thirteen colonies from their British overlord, France agreed, partly through the good offices of Benjamin Franklin and the Marquis de Lafayette, to provide substantial financial and military assistance to support the American cause. Without such help, it is doubtful George Washington's insurrection would have succeeded, and American history may have turned out very differently. Nevertheless, Franco-American relations have wavered back and forth over the past two centuries, with seminal moments of cooperation and conflict. Great Britain, due to cultural and historical affinities, has often been the United States' preferred ally in Europe, a bond cemented by the "special relationship" forged in the fires of the Second World War. Nevertheless, following Britain's vote to leave the European Union on June 23, 2016, the privileged partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom has come under strain. The American government made clear its preference for the UK to remain in the EU, with President Obama emphasizing that Brexit would relegate Britain to the "back of the queue".
Although US officials, and Obama in particular, quickly backtracked after the vote by assuring that Brexit would change nothing in the "special relationship", it is hard to believe that Britain's departure from the EU will not affect the future evolution of transatlantic relations. While the strong bonds between the US and the UK will endure, Brexit leaves the United States with no other choice but to reinforce ties with other allies in the EU. This paper suggests that transatlantic relations are likely to evolve towards a system of multiple partnerships and alliances, thus presenting an opportunity for enhanced cooperation between Europe and the US. Over time, a new privileged partnership with the United States could emerge based on the Franco-German axis, with France an ally of choice for foreign and military policy, and Germany for economic and trade policy. While the United Kingdom will remain a key ally for the United States, Obama's successors will have to adapt to the novel situation triggered by Britain's vote to leave the EU. The first part of this paper will provide the context of transatlantic relations before Brexit, the second part will analyze how the US might transition towards a system of multiple partnerships with Europe, and the third part will look into future possibilities for transatlantic cooperation in the years to come.
Historic background and context
Over the past few decades, modern Franco-American relations have fluctuated back and forth. It should be emphasized, however, that despite General de Gaulle's periodic quarrels with the US, relations between the two countries have generally been good. Indeed, de Gaulle provided unwavering French support to President Kennedy at critical times such as the Cuban missile crisis, and his successors consistently sought to strengthen ties with the United States. For example, France was a key contributor to the US-led coalition during the first Gulf War in 1991, and to NATO's aerial bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo during the 1990's. Nevertheless, despite this overall positive trend, French President Chirac refused to follow the US-led "coalition of the willing" into Iraq in 2003. Although France had displayed strong support for the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was at the forefront of the coalition that intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, Chirac threatened to veto any UN Security Council resolution on the Iraq issue. The former French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin made an impassioned speech before the UN General Assembly condemning the intervention in Iraq. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded by "punishing France" with a government-encouraged boycott of traditional French products, such as wine and cheese, and the renaming of French fries as "freedom fries" at the White House. When Obama took office in 2008, the context of Franco-American relations had reached an historic low point.
All this stands in sharp contrast to the "special relationship" that the United States has enjoyed with the United Kingdom, born out of strong historic and cultural affinities. Despite occasional caveats, Britain has consistently stood shoulder to shoulder with its American ally on the international stage. For example, Prime Minister Tony Blair, echoing Churchill's remarks to de Gaulle that if Britain had to decide between Europe and "the open sea", it would always choose the "open sea" (i.e. the United States), positioned the UK on the frontlines of the US-led "coalition of the willing" that intervened in Iraq in 2003, against staunch French and German opposition. Furthermore, from the American viewpoint, the "special relationship" also had a very strategic purpose: the US could rely on the UK to support EU policies in Brussels that aligned with, or at least were not opposed to, American interests. Before Brexit, the UK had the advantage of being both at the heart of the English speaking world and part of the European Union. Many American businesses, banks, law firms and financial institutions established their European headquarters in London as their key entry point to access the lucrative EU common market.
The resurgence of Germany as the dominant power in Europe, along with the relative decline of French influence, has also impacted transatlantic relations. France played a leading role in launching the European project after WWII. President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer developed a strong personal bond that led to the signing of the "Elysée Treaty" in 1963, cementing Franco-German partnership as the pillar of the European project. Throughout the Cold War, with Germany divided and the United Kingdom choosing to remain on the sidelines, France enjoyed strong influence in the European Community. The Franco-German partnership was balanced. Following Germany's costly reunification during the 1990's and early 2000's, France's economy performed better than Germany's, and Germany became known as the "sick man of Europe". Since 2006, however, the situation has reversed; the gap between the French and German economies has widened significantly since the 2008 global financial crisis. Over the last decade, Germany has systematically outperformed France in almost all economic indicators, including GDP, growth, unemployment, balance of trade and debt levels.
This position of growing economic strength shifted the balance of power in Europe. Germany assumed a leadership role in the EU with the onset of the Euro debt crisis, at a time when most other member states, like France, faced serious economic challenges. Unsurprisingly, this new situation has affected the evolution of transatlantic relations over the last decade. In response to the changing dynamics across the Atlantic, the Obama administration has come to recognize Germany as the key decision-maker in the EU. Despite occasional disputes over issues such as spying, there has been a clear rapprochement between the US and Germany. For example, Obama has turned towards Merkel first to discuss transatlantic economic and trade matters, or even for international problems such as the migrant crisis. Consequently, up until the Brexit vote, Germany and the UK often took precedence over France in the eyes of Washington as privileged partners for transatlantic relations, albeit for different reasons.
A system of multiple partnerships and alliances in transatlantic relations after Brexit
Brexit represents a potentially significant change in the balance of power on the continent. As long as the EU is able to prevent contagion after Brexit, the UK's departure from the EU is likely to transform transatlantic relations in the coming decades. If the European project is able to move forward and member states succeed in re-launching the process of "ever closer union", then the United Sates will need to modify the way it interacts with its European partners. A new system of multiple partnerships and alliances is likely to develop over time. While Obama's successors will be keen to maintain the close relationship with the UK, they will have no other choice but to strengthen ties with other EU allies, particularly the Franco-German axis as the pillar of the European project.
For instance, following Brexit, the US will most likely accelerate its rapprochement with Germany as the dominant economic power in the EU. Obama had relied on the UK under Prime Minister Cameron to support the American viewpoint with his EU allies during negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), with the aim to create a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). With Brexit, the US will have to work much more closely with Germany if any agreement is to be reached. France and Italy, as the second and third largest economies in the EU respectively, have an important role to play. However, due to significant and continuing financial difficulties, it is hard to see how they could displace Germany as the uncontested EU leader in this policy area. Moreover, France and Italy have traditionally not shared the same views on free trade as the United States, and French President Hollande has been strongly opposed to TAFTA in its current form, threatening to veto the continuation of negotiations if the US does not compromise on key issues. The German conservative party is much closer to US views about free trade, enhancing Merkel's position as Obama's interlocutor of first choice on transatlantic economic and trade discussions. Likewise, because of their economic importance, the US has also worked closely with other EU allies during TAFTA negotiations, including Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Poland, a process likely to continue following Britain's departure from the EU.
Furthermore, Frankfurt is better positioned than Paris or Rome to replace London as the EU's new financial capital, due to a more competitive and attractive tax regime, flexible regulations and labor laws. Much will depend on what terms the new British Prime Minister Theresa May is able to negotiate regarding Brexit, and whether the UK retains full access to the single market. While the UK will remain an important financial and economic partner for the US, it is likely that Germany, instead of France, could become the new entry point for US corporations to access the EU market. Likewise, Dublin, capital of the Republic of Ireland is well-positioned to replace London as a potential relocation point for US corporations seeking entry, due to its EU membership and use of the English-language.
Britain's departure from the EU may also open-up a security and military policy gap in Europe. Although the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the EU's capacity to intervene as an international actor, it also defined foreign and defense issues as intergovernmental policy areas. This means that member states retain their power of veto, as well as their ability to conduct their own national policies in these domains. Thus, important foreign policy and military decisions continue to be taken by member states themselves, which then seek to coordinate their responses to international crises through mechanisms such as the European Council (between heads of state) or the Council of the EU (between foreign or defense ministers). This has been the way Europe has responded to many of the most significant international crises over the last few years, where bilateral and multilateral negotiations between member states in Brussels were necessary to coordinate a common response, in collaboration with major allies such as the United States.
US President Obama has been keen to emphasize that, despite Brexit, the UK's security role in Europe will be maintained. Likewise, Michael Fallon, the British Secretary of State for Defense, has underlined that Brexit will not modify in any way the UK's military commitments as a key NATO ally and guarantor of European security. Indeed, since the Brexit vote, the UK has reinforced its military presence in Estonia to defend NATO's eastern front, renewed its nuclear Trident submarine program, and enhanced collaboration with key EU allies such as France in the fight against the Islamic State. Together with its historic ties to the Commonwealth and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the UK has relied on its global clout to play a leading role in influencing how Europe has responded to various international crises.
Nevertheless, Britain's departure from the EU means that it will no longer have a seat at the European Council or the Council of the EU, where certain key foreign and defense policy decisions are taken. Thus, the scope of its previous influence is likely to diminish. In all certainty, Britain will continue to be consulted as a prominent ally, and it is essential for the EU and the US to maintain close cooperation with the UK after Brexit in order to preserve the cohesion and effectiveness of the NATO alliance. However, the fact that Britain will no longer be at the negotiating table in Brussels means that the US arguably has no other choice but to reinforce defense cooperation with other EU allies. As a result, a new system of multiple partnerships and alliances will likely develop for transatlantic security relations in the years to come. While the historic bond between the US and the UK will endure, Brexit presents EU countries with an opportunity for enhanced cooperation with the US within the NATO framework. Continental Europe contains many of the world's leading militaries that are key NATO allies, having provided consistent support to the United States during international crises.
For example, since reunification, Germany has succeed in positioning itself as a strategic partner for the US. Germany's first foreign military engagement since WWII took place during the 1990's, when the Luftwaffe participated in NATO air strikes against Serbian forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. In response to the unstable international context over the last few years, there appears to have been a turning point in Germany's attitude towards its armed forces, ending a taboo that dates back to WWII. For the upcoming fiscal year, the German government has proposed to increase defense spending by €1.7 billion, representing a 6.8 percent rise compared to the current year. This is not a short term policy, as the government is aiming to spend €39.18 billion on defense by 2020, add nearly 7000 soldiers to the German military by 2023, and spend 130 billion euros on new equipment by 2030. Already, Germany has begun to play a more important role on the world stage, including its contribution to bolstering NATO's eastern European defenses in response to Russian aggression, more troops for the EU's common defense policy to support French interventions in Africa, as well as enhanced participation in the air strikes of the US-led coalition fighting the Islamic State.
Similarly, Italy and Spain are both military powers that host strategic US overseas military bases, which have served as key platforms for NATO operations in the the Medditerranean and North Africa. They have both provided contributions to the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, and more recently to NATO's 2011 operation in Libya, bolstering their position as valuable US allies in Europe. Likewise, recent Russian interventionism in Ukraine has encouraged countries in Eastern and Northern Europe to significantly increase their military spending and enhance cooperation with the US through regular joint military training. Baltic states, which share a border with Russia, have reacted strongly, with Latvia increasing its defense budget by nealy 60% this year, followed by Lithuania with a 35% increase, and Estonia with a 9% increase. Poland, currently positioned as the main military power in Eastern Europe, has also raised defense spening by 9%, and Sweden is seriously debating the possibility of joining NATO after outlining a plan to increase military spending by 11% over the next five years.
All this coincides with a dramatic reversal of American military disengagement from Europe since the end of the Cold War. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, US President Obama announced in June 2014 the launching of a "European Reassurance Initiative" (ERI), a one-year emergency response of $1 billion to bolster NATO's eastern defenses. Following the continuing escalation of tensions with Russia, not only in Ukraine but also in Syria, the US Congress has approved Obama's proposal to quadruple funding for the ERI to $3.4 billion in 2017, up from $789 million in 2016. Moreover, the ERI enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress, which means that it has become a long-term commitment, forming part of a multi-year plan to "reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance". Thus, given the level of its current commitment to European security, the US will need to enhance defense cooperation with continental European countries following Britain's departure from the EU in order to maintain the unity and potency of the NATO alliance.
These developments make France a potential ally of choice for the future evolution of security relations between Europe and the United States. Although all NATO members make valuable contributions to the alliance, France and the UK have historically been the dominant military powers in Europe since WWII. Therefore, following Brexit, the US will have to work more closely with France on EU military cooperation. Indeed, despite recent increases, Germany's spending on defense still represents only 1.2% of its GDP with 34.9 $ billion in 2015, and projected increases in the coming years are likely to remain far below the 2% NATO target. This contrasts with France, which spent 2.1% of its GDP on defense in 2015 (50.9 $ billion) and Britain, which spent 2% of its GDP on defense the same year (55.5 $ billion). For historic reasons, Germany has not been keen on investing to re-become a major military power on the same level as France or the UK, with public opinion preferring instead to invest in domestic infrastructure or education. Likewise, all other countries in the EU do not come close to equaling France's military capacity or defense budget, the closest being Italy, which spends less than half of what France spends on defense (23.8 $ billion in 2015, representing only 1.3% of its share in GDP).
Indeed, France has one of the most forward-deployed armies in the world, an experienced and powerful military that has been successfully mobilized for operations around the globe. The country has played a critical role in battling and containing terrorism and civil unrest throughout its former colonial sphere in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Most recently, the French military intervened in the Ivory Coast (since 2002), Libya (2011), Mali (2013), the Central African Republic (2013), Chad (2014), Iraq (2014) and Syria (2015). France has maintained a network of major military bases throughout the African continent, and currently has over 10,000 troops deployed across five countries, including Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Moreover, France is also a nuclear power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which makes it part of the very select club of global decision-makers.
Another advantage enjoyed by France is that it does not need to rely on Parliamentary approval for foreign military intervention, allowing the French military to intervene rapidly, effectively and at short notice. The French President enjoys far more powers than many of his democratic peers, especially when compared to Parliamentary regimes such as the UK, a situation clearly illustrated during the summer of 2013. As US President Obama wavered on whether or not to launch air strikes in Syria following Assad's use of chemical weapons, the UK Parliament voted against intervening with the US in Syria. By contrast, President Hollande had the French military ready to intervene at short notice, with no need for Parliamentary review. Moreover, France has consistently increased its military spending over the last few years, and the pace has accelerated following the wave of terrorism that hit the country in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015. The French President has announced a plan to increase defense spending by four billion euros from 2016-20 to tackle terrorism at home and overseas, a figure that has been revised upwards following the terrorist attacks in Nice last July.
Therefore, while transatlantic security relations are likely to develop towards a situation of multiple partnerships following Brexit, France is well positioned to play a leading role. Indeed, closer analysis reveals that, long before the Brexit vote, a noticeable rapprochement between France and the United States had already begun with Obama's election in 2008. Keen to restore good relations with the US following a sharp deterioration under the Bush years, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy decided in 2009 that France's military should re-join NATO's integrated command structure. This put an end to 43 years of semi-detachment following de Gaulle's controversial decision to withdraw back in 1966. Subsequently, France has been at the forefront of all US military interventions under Obama, with President Sarkozy taking the initiative for the 2011 intervention in Libya. He not only succeeded in convincing his reluctant American ally to support a NATO operation, but also pushed for the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to provide a context of legality (even though the end result of the intervention is now open to debate). Likewise, the French military has worked in very close cooperation with the US military for all its interventions on the African continent, including in Mali (January 2013) and in the Central African Republic (December 2013). According to two American officials, the US army's global commitments are already significant, thus the value of France's military contribution is the French army's ability to intervene decisively and at short notice, precluding the need for US intervention and making France a dependable ally in an emergency situation.
More recently, France and the United States have stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against the so-called Islamic State; France, for example, has provided the second largest contribution to the international coalition engaged in air strikes in Syria and Iraq. Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, US President Obama allowed French President Hollande to have increased access to US intelligence regarding ISIS, a symbolic show of solidary, unprecedented since WWII. The height of this Franco-American rapprochement arguably occurred on January 20th 2016, when US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter explained during a press conference in Paris that he spoke more often and worked more closely with his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian than with any other ally. This is a clear indication of a fundamental transformation in Franco-American relations. It would appear that any acrimony from the Bush years following France's refusal to join the US-led coalition in Iraq, as well as historic tensions linked to France's participation in NATO, has now subsided. Under Obama, the United States has initiated a rapprochement with France as a key European ally for matters of foreign and defense policy, a trend that should accelerate after Britain's departure from the EU.
Scenarios for the future evolution of transatlantic security relations
Another very significant aspect of Brexit for the future of transatlantic relations has to do with its impact on the evolution of the EU's independent foreign and defense policy, known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). As discussed above, the Lisbon Treaty defined foreign and defense issues as intergovernmental policies, with member states retaining their own national policies in these areas. Nevertheless, European countries have gradually come to realize that, regardless of the importance of safeguarding national sovereignty, pooling resources towards a larger European foreign policy is likely to enhance their influence on the world stage. Thus, ever since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, subsequent EU treaties have succeeded in gradually building an independent EU common foreign and defense policy, with the Lisbon Treaty ushering in significant new developments. The latter created two new offices to represent the EU abroad: a Permanent European Council President and a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, to be supported by the "European External Action Service".
Once the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer have as much influence in shaping the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although the latter is still at an embryonic stage, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, has played an active role on the world stage, particularly with respect to negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the influx of refugees. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has also emerged as an incipient EU foreign ministry, providing valuable support to the High representative. Because it is not a state, the EU has often been able to influence the outcome of negotiations by positioning itself as a neutral referee between conflicting parties. Examples include the EU becoming a member of the so-called 'Quartet'– together with the UN, the US and Russia - which begun in 2002 to negotiate a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This underlines how the US has begun to engage with the EU as a serious and credible international partner. Since Brexit is likely to diminish the UK's influence over the CFSP, the United States will need to adapt to this new reality and engage more closely with other EU allies on foreign policy issues.
Moreover, until Brexit, France and the United Kingdom had been at the core of initiatives for European defense cooperation. This includes a network of bilateral and multilateral defense agreements such as the Saint-Malo and Lancaster House Accords, as well as the embryonic Common Security and Defense Policy. Over the last two decades, the EU has begun to emerge as a non-negligible security actor on the international stage. Since 2003, it has successfully carried out 30 peace missions and operations both in Europe and across the globe, including in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Far East, composed of battle groups with soldiers drawn from member states. The fact that Britain will leave the EU opens a big question mark on its future contribution to any such common defense initiative. While France and the UK have reaffirmed that Brexit would change nothing to their bilateral military cooperation, it is likely the UK will cease to participate in the CSDP.
Since defense remains an intergovernmental policy area, the CSDP has had to focus on soft security, which involves crisis management, conflict prevention, nation building and post-conflict reconstruction. Although limited when compared to the hard military power of countries such as France or the UK, the CSDP has nonetheless succeeded in gradually enhancing its profile. For instance, EU peace missions have played a crucial role in countries such as Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia, facilitating the transition from civil war to peace, democracy and the rule of law. Six CSDP missions have, in fact, utilized military force, demonstrating that the EU has become capable of deploying a limited form of hard power, although still on a much smaller scale than states. Although unrelated to the CSDP, another example of "hard power" would be the EU's ability to impose sanctions on Russia in the wake of its invasion of Crimea (first in July 2014 and renewed since then), which have had a negative impact on the Russian economy.
Britain will be leaving the EU at a volatile moment in international politics. Although a rising force on the world stage, the limitations of the EU's soft security capacity were highlighted recently in crises such as the Arab Spring and Russian aggression in Ukraine. In both cases, it was the hard military power wielded independently by member states, either through NATO's intervention in Libya or the bolstering of defense cooperation to deter Russia in Eastern Europe, which played the leading role. The recent deterioration in international relations underlines that hard power is still an essential aspect of world politics, and that the EU's current capabilities as a soft security actor are no longer sufficient. This situation has led several member states to argue for the urgent need to reinforce EU military cooperation. For example, despite ongoing criticism towards Brussels regarding the EU's migrant policy, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has recently called for the creation of a joint EU army to counter the threat posed by Russia. While the project of a more united European defense has been debated for decades, the EU is currently surrounded by unstable regions such as the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe, a position that renders such an initiative more urgent than ever. As a result, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Junker proposed during his 2016 annual address in Strasbourg to create a "permanent EU military headquarters to work towards a common military force" in the years to come.
Brexit means that a stronger and more united EU military is now possible, as the UK had previously been opposed to any type of integration for defense. Fearful of potential duplication with NATO, as well as loss of control in an area considered the core of national sovereignty, Britain had always vetoed any attempt to reinforce EU defense beyond bilateral cooperation. As long as there is no domino effect after Brexit, then it is likely the process of "ever closer union" will resume, particularly in areas of foreign and defense policy where there is a pressing need for it. The paradox is that, while Euroscepticism is on the rise, foreign affairs and defense represent two aspects of EU policy that continue to enjoy widespread popular support across Europe. Opinion polls carried out over the last twenty years consistently reveal that between 65 % to 75% of European people support the reinforcing of EU external relations and military capacity, which underlines that there is great potential for further integration in these areas. The UK's departure from the EU will open-up many new possibilities for reinforcing the CSDP beyond soft security. For example, in early October, France and Germany signed an agreement to share an air base and transport planes as a first step in reinforcing EU defense cooperation after Brexit.
A federal European army is not on the agenda; given the current volatile situation within the EU, advocating one is both unrealistic and counter-productive. Therefore, the intergovernmental method is likely to prove the best pathway forward, and greater permanent structured cooperation between EU defense contributors is likely to emerge in the years to come on this base. However, the exact shape of the future CSDP is currently being debated, with several potential approaches having been suggested. These range from conservative or realistic approaches that involve slightly upgrading current institutional arrangements to more ambitious and comprehensive approaches that would enhance both the range and scope of EU defense cooperation. France, as the principal military force in the EU after Bexit, is ideally positioned to lead attemps to reform the CSDP. Nevertheless, France cannot bear on its own the whole burden of EU security, which will require extensive cooperation between all member states. Moreover, in order not to weaken the cohesion of NATO and the Western alliance as a whole, it is essential that a reformed EU defense structure be associated as much as possible with other NATO allies that are not members of the EU, including Canada, Norway or Britain. Indeed, despite Brexit, the UK remains the second largest contributor to NATO after the US, thus it would be absurd not to closely associate Britain to the CSDP. Nevertheless, associatd status is not the same thing as full membership, and Brexit means that the UK will likely cease to be part of the CSDP in the near future.
Thus, if the EU succeeds in developing a more cohesive defense policy, then the United States would need to adapt to this new situation by reinforcing military cooperation with the CSDP in the years to come. Extensive negotiations on what the implications are for NATO, where the US currently enjoys a dominant position, will be necessary. Despite fears of duplication, however, it is arguable that a stronger EU defense is not only fully compatible with NATO, it may even help to strengthen the alliance at a time of great international instability. If the EU were to develop a system of permanent structured military cooperation, this would add to NATO's already formidable capacities. The President of the EU Commission confirmed that "a common (EU) military force should be in complement to NATO ... More defense in Europe doesn't mean less transatlantic solidarity." In fact, the US had been complaining for some time that NATO allies were not spending their fair share on defense compared to the US. Hence, a stronger EU military capacity would allow for more equitable burden-sharing. As long as the US would be willing to provide the EU with a more important voice within NATO, there would be no danger of weakening the cohesion of the alliance. NATO is likely to be reinforced by a more balanced decision-making structure, a factor that some American officials may find hard to accept, at least initially. All this is of course hypothetical, and only time will tell if the EU is able to pull together as a credible international security actor, and how the US reacts to this.
Brexit represents a potentially significant change to the way transatlantic relations have been carried-out since WWII. Much will depend on what terms the new British Prime Minister Theresa May is able to negotiate for Brexit. Nevertheless, the fact that the UK is going to leave the EU means that, while US officials will be keen to maintain their close relation with Britain, they will need to strengthen ties with other EU allies in the years to come. A second "special relationship" could develop based on the Franco-German axis as the main pillar of the European project. Over the next few years, France is well positioned to become America's European partner of choice for security and defense policy, and Germany for economic and trade policy. France, as the only remaining major military power in Europe after Brexit, is poised to lead the reinforcement of the EU's common foreign and defense policy, meaning that Franco-American relations will be key to the future evolution of transatlantic security. Likewise, given that Germany has now become the dominant economic power in the EU, German-American relations will also become very important to the future evolution of transatlantic economic and trade issues.
Brexit should not be taken lightly, as it represents a potentially major threat to the cohesion of the Western alliance, at a time when there is a need to stand together to meet multiple challenges, ranging from Islamic terrorism to Russian aggression. If Brexit is not handled well, then there is the risk of a domino effect within the EU, bringing down the Western alliance as a whole. Indeed, if the EU were to implode, nationalistic tensions might resurface in Europe, bringing an end to peaceful cooperation since WWII. In reaction, the United States could well lose interest in an old continent mired by internal feuding, especially after losing Britain as its closest interlocutor in transatlantic relations. This might encourage the US either to retreat once again into isolationism as it did after WWI, or, as a more likely scenario, to simply ignore Europe and accelerate its pivot towards Asia as the central concern of its foreign policy.
Either scenario would be fatal and the Western alliance would not survive, opening the dangerous possibility of renewed Russian expansionism into Europe. For precisely these reasons, it is essential that Brexit be handled well by all actors concerned, and that a smooth transition towards a system of multiple partnerships and alliances is built in the years to come. The EU and the UK need to find a compromise settlement that achieves the difficult balancing act of maintaining Britain's association with Europe, while avoiding the threat of contagion from a domino effect. Likewise, the US and the EU must continue to engage with the UK as a major international partner in order to maintain the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO. Most importantly however, in order to reinvigorate the Western Alliance, it is essential for the US and the EU to find new ways of enhancing their collaboration on all issues. Therefore, building a new transatlantic partnership based on the Franco-German axis may be one of the best ways of allowing the Western alliance to survive, thrive, and, together, successfully meet the new challenges of the 21st century.
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 Speech by US President Barack Obama during his visit to the UK, April 22, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36115138
 Haass R., Political Losses From Brexit Will Be Deep and Enduring, Financial Times (June 24, 2016).
 Le Corre P., After Brexit, the US will need a new "BFF", The Brookings Institution https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/06/28/after-brexit-u-s-will-need-a-new-bff/
 When General de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 to become the first President of the Fifth French Republic, tensions with the United States emerged when he decided to withdraw France's military from NATO. De Gaulle withdrew French forces stage by stage from 1959 to 1966 in order to enhance France's independence, believing that the integrated military structure was dominated by the United States. Although the General was keen to reassure his allies that France would remain part of the political organization of NATO, his policy prompted an angry reaction by US President Lyndon Johnson, and complicated Franco-American relations for the rest of the Cold War.
 CNN International (March 12, 2003). http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/
 Speech by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the House of Commons, May 11, 1953. Taken from Langworth R., Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations, Public Affairs Press (2008).
 Indeed, de Gaulle had feared that the UK would act like a Trojan horse for the United States in the European Community, hence he vetoed Britain's application for membership twice in the 1960's. See: Bozo F., French Foreign Policy since 1945: An Introduction, Berghahn Books (2016).
 French foreign minister Robert Schuman was a driving force in helping to launch the initial Coal and Steel community back in 1951.
 The Economist (June 3, 1999), 'The Sick Man of the Euro'. http://www.economist.com/node/209559
 The Economist (January 9, 2014), 'Can François do a Gerhard?' See : http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21593456-president-talking-reform-it-his-interest-and-his-countrys-he-should-carry-it
 This is clear in the way in which Merkel succeeded in imposing fiscal discipline across the EU, against initial opposition from French Socialist President Hollande, underlining how the Franco-German partnership is no longer as balanced as it used to be. The fact that the Socialist French President has not succeeded in mitigating the impact of austerity highlights France's declining influence in the EU, as this was one of Hollande's main electoral promises, particularly the re-negotiation of the fiscal compact.
 Oreskes B., Germany: America's real special relationship. Brexit accelerates US shift away from the UK, POLITICO (June 30, 2016). http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/germany-brexit-relationship-225000
 Rankin J., 'Doubts rise over TTIP as France threatens to block EU-US deal', The Guardian (May 3, 2016). https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/03/doubts-rise-over-ttip-as-france-threatens-to-block-eu-us-deal
 Bindi F. and Angelescu I., The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World (2nd edition), The Brookings Institution, Washington (2012).
 Speech by US President Barack Obama during the NATO Summit on July 8, 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36744187
 Fallon M., Le Brexit ne modifiera pas l'engagement britannique pour la sécurité européenne (Brexit will not modify Britain's engagement in European security), Le Monde, 21 July 2016: http://www.lemonde.fr/referendum-sur-le-brexit/article/2016/07/21/michael-fallon-le-brexit-ne-modifiera-pas-l-engagement-britannique-pour-la-securite-europeenne_4972551_4872498.html
 Hoffmann L., German Defense Spending Hike Reflects Regional Trend, Defense News (24 March 2016) http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2016/03/24/german-defense-spending-hike-reflects-regional-trend/82204164/
 Smale A., In a Reversal, Germany's Military Growth Is Met With Western Relief, The New York Times (5 June 2016). http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/europe/european-union-germany-army.html?_r=0
 Jones S., Defence spending by Nato's Europe states up as uncertainty rises, Financial Times (30 May 2016). https://www.ft.com/content/e0058620-259d-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89 russian-aggression-drives-swedish-defense-spending/79841348/
 O'Dwyer G., Russian Aggression Drives Swedish Defense Spending, Defense News (February 7 2016): http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2016/02/07/russian-aggression-drives-swedish-defense-spending/79841348/
 Cancian M. F. & Samp L. S., The European Reassurance Initiative, Critical Questions - Center for Strategic and International Studies (9 February 2016). https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-reassurance-initiative-0
 Perlo-Freeman S., Fleurant A., Wezeman P. and Wezeman S., Trends in World Military Expenditure, SIPRI Fact Sheet (2016). http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf
 Bender J., France's Military Is All Over Africa, Business Insider UK (22 January 2015). http://uk.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1?r=US&IR=T
 In his effort to end what he perceived as a weakness of the Parliamentary regime under the Fourth Republic, General de Gaulle had insisted on crafting the Fifth Republic with a strong executive. The French President must inform Parliament within three days of a military intervention, which may lead to a debate but no vote. The Parliament only votes if the intervention lasts for more than four months, in which case it must agree to any prolongation. See: Bozo F., French Foreign Policy since 1945: An Introduction, Berghahn Books (2016).
 BBC news (April 29, 2015), France increases defence spending 'to counter extremism'. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32509301
 Cox M., Stokes D., U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd edition), Oxford University Press (2012).
 Interviews with a Pentagon Official, August 11, 2016 and with a State Department Official, August 30, 2016, both in Washington D.C.
 US Department of Defense (January 20, 2016), Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and French Minister of Defense Le Drian in Paris, France. http://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/643932/joint-press-conference-by-secretary-carter-and-french-minister-of-defense-le-dr
 US Department of Defense (January 20, 2016), Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and French Minister of Defense Le Drian in Paris, France. http://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/643932/joint-press-conference-by-secretary-carter-and-french-minister-of-defense-le-dr
 Keukeleire S., Delreux T., The Foreign Policy of the European Union (2nd edition
 European External Action Service, Security and defence - CSDP. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/
 Briançon P., Brexit or not, France and Britain deepen military alliance, POLITICO (July 5, 2016). http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-or-not-france-and-britain-deepen-military-alliance-lancaster-treaties-defense-david-cameron-nicolas-sarkozy/
 THill C. and Smith M., International Relations and the European Union (2nd edition), Oxford University Press (2011).
 The 2000 combat troops deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, without any NATO back-up, demonstrated the EU's ability to fight high-intensity battles against sizeable insurgent forces. Ibid.
 BBC news (August 26, 2016), Czechs and Hungarians call for joint EU army amid security worries. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37196802
 Speech by Jean-Claude Juncker to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, September 14, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-3735919
 BBC news (September 14, 2016), Juncker proposes EU military headquarters. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37359196
 De France O., What EU citizens think about European defence, European Union Institute for Security Studies (2013): http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_43_CSDP_polls_01.pdf
 Radio France Internationale (5 October 2016), France, Germany to share military facilities post Brexit: http://en.rfi.fr/france/20161005-france-germany-share-military-facilities
 Giuliani J. D., Réassurer la défense de l'Europe : Projet de traité pour la défense et la sécurité de l'Europe, Policy Paper - Questions d'Europe n°405, Fondation Robert Schuman (3 October 2016).
 Keohane D. and Mölling C., Conservative, Comprehensive, Ambitious or Realistic? Assessing EU Defense Strategy Approaches, Policy Brief No.41 - Foreign and Security Policy Program, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (2016).
 De Galbert S., Are European Countries Really 'Free Riders'?, The Atlantic (March 24, 2016) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/obama-doctrine-europe-free-riders/475245/
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The European Union and Transatlantic Relations: the Rotating Presidencies of France, Czech Republic and Sweden
The existing literature on the European Union (EU) Presidency and transatlantic relations is very broad. This research includes assessments about the trio presidencies of France, Czech Republic, Sweden and transatlantic relations of EU during these presidencies. Before one can start discussing the details of each presidency’s relations with the US, it is crucial to recall what EU Council Presidency is and how it is likely to develop in the future. The first thing that should be stressed is that EU Council Presidency is not the presidency of EU but the presidency of one of the EU institutions. The responsibility of EU Presidency is first to play the role of a chairperson and to listen to the views of different member states. Hence this responsibility of EU Presidency requires leadership but before leadership it requires dialogue and to put a side his/her national position to reach European consensus. However as it is well known EU is a community of nation states. Some of these nation states are very strict against anything that challenges their dominance in the political arena although when they became EU member, they pool their sovereignty to EU as a supranational entity. Any tendencies that had cross-national assertions and ties are regarded with suspicion. National orientations of member states towards EU are diverse. For some member states, the EU was an opportunity. For others it is a restriction. This research investigates whether member states during their EU Presidency give priority to their own national interests or give priority to EU as a supranational institution. In this respect mainly this research focuses on EU and its transatlantic relations specifically during the trio presidencies of France, Czech Republic, and Sweden. For expediency, a more concrete assessment of each country’s bilateral relations with the US will be examined, and additionally, their relations under EU Presidency umbrella will be evaluated.
“The relationship between US and Europe constitutes the world’s strongest, most comprehensive and strategically most important partnership”1 especially in case of economy they dominate world trade and they provide lion share of economic development. EU and US represent %40 of the world trade and they hold together 80% of the global capital markets.2 In general EU and US agree on some common objectives about the strategies on peace, stability and economic development in the world.
Although generally they share common objectives and a similar analysis of threats, the methods that each use for achieving their objective,s or for fighting against threats is distinctive. This situation caused some people to ask whether EU and US actually are friends or rivals.3 Hence EU-US relations are certainly the most powerful yet also one of the most complicated relations in the world.
The EU-US partnership has remained the focus of any EU foreign policy strategy, although there had been occasional fluctuations in the transatlantic relationship over the past 50 years. Besides the many areas of cooperation, there are many areas of clashing attitudes especially about political and strategic issues. One of the recent issues that caused conflict between EU and US was the unilateral decision of US to wage out war on terror on the basis of former US President Bush’s polarizing neoconservative doctrine of “prevention, preemption, preeminence.”4The policies of Bush administration like high reliance on US military power, US perception of axis of evil (actually President Bush’s perception) which led to invasion of Iraq and also the perfunctory and simplistic policies of US administration towards the complicated situation of Middle East are the policies that created tensions on the relationship between EU-US.
The unilateral decision of US in Iraq led to divisions among the Europeans. Division between one who is willing to act with US, and the other, who is refusing to join in action with the US. Because of this division, American neoconservatives promoted an agenda which defines these divisions as “those who are with us and those who are against us.”4
One can analyze EU’s transatlantic relations in three broad phases as Burghardt did in his diplomacy paper. These phases are mainly;
1- From the early beginnings in late 1940’s to the end of Cold War in 1989
2- From 1989 to 9/11 in 2001
3- From 9/11 to the era of new realism5
In addition to these three phases of Burghardt, as fourth phase President Obama and his administration’s attitudes towards EU will be examined in the following.
1- From the early beginnings in late 1940’s to the end of Cold War in 1989
In the post second world war era, European powers came together and created a project for replacing failed system of national sovereignty with a community of nation states in which nation states pool their sovereignty through some rules and institutions to the community. This project was also highly supported by US. “During this period US assumed the role of an active, protecting power as a mediator in Europe without being a European power.”6
In the Cold War era, the most significant issue for US was the reconstruction and stabilization of Western Europe became the backbone of US doctrine of containment. In this period all US presidents had been influential in supporting the concept of an organized transatlantic relationship based on a military alliance which refers to NATO with US as the dominant member and also transatlantic relationship based on European Community and US partnership. For this purpose in 1947, Marshall Plan was applied for helping the devastated European economies to recover.
In 1953 during the Eisenhower administration, the first full diplomatic representative, a US ambassador was accredited to European institutions. After the implementation of Paris and Rome treaties, cooperation between European Community and US rapidly increased. Deliberations were held with US administration by the Commission.
From early 1980’s to the Single European Act of 1985 and until the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the American President and European Community kept in touch regularly. In 1989, US President Bush uttered his feelings about Europe’s future by saying that “the fall of Berlin wall and dissolution of Soviet Union opened the prospect of a Europe whole and free.”7
From 1989 to 9/11
The fall of Berlin Wall and dissolution of Soviet Union could be considered as a turning point for Europe’s future and it symbolized the greatest common achievement of US and Europe. Both parties were influential in this process. US was influential with its determination which was highly based on military power. Europe was also influential with its model of European integration which had attracted the people living under communist regime. Hence, post 1989 ‘free’ Europe, would not be possible with the US or Europe acting alone.
In the post 1989 era, relationship between US and EC/EU is much stronger. They share common security threats; such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, regional conflicts, the first Gulf war and the Balkan wars. These common threats led to more rapprochements between the parties.
In 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration signed between the US and EU which enabled regular political deliberations at all levels. The transatlantic declaration also strengthened their partnership in order to support democracy to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights, individual liberty, and international security also by cooperating other nations fight against aggression, coercion and prevent conflicts that could lead to war.8
In 1995, EU and US went beyond transatlantic declaration and they signed the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). By this agenda there had been achieved more progress in transatlantic relations. NTA embodies the constitutional basis of US-EU relations and also regular meetings at presidential and ministerial levels. NTA mainly has four objectives as “promoting peace, stability democracy and development; expanding world trade and economic growth, meeting global challenges and building ties between EU and US representatives from business, academic, consumer, labor, environment and government circles.”9
Relative to the adoption of NTA, a joint EU-US Action Plan was also prepared which directed the EU and US to large number of measures within the overall areas of cooperation. Furthermore, in 1998 London Summit parties reached an agreement which provided cooperation in the area of trade and it is called Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). A great deal of economic cooperation takes place between EU and US in the forms of international multilateral economic forums such as G7/8, the WTO, IMF and WB.
The years from the end of Cold War till the election of President Bush can be defined as one of the most intense period of transatlantic integration. However, with the election of Bush as president the direction of the relations had changed. Because of the President Bush’s attitudes in number of important international commitments, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court Treaty. Also, US bilaterally decided to reduce the number of meetings with the EU to one per year which furthered the confrontations between the EU and US. When the first annual EU-US Summit took place in June 2001 in Sweden, members of European Union harshly criticized US president. These developments led to tensions between EU and US during the first eight months preceding 9/11.
2- From 9/11 to New Realism
On 9th of September 2001, traditional sense of America’s invulnerability and security at home was entirely changed by the unprecedented terrorist attacks on US. 9/11 was thus a turning point in American foreign and security policy. After the attacks, President Bush waged war on terrorism and this decision led to divisions in the European Union. EU split into those who decided to support US and those who opposed the US action and preferred more comprehensive, internationally legitimized approach against terrorism. They preferred to use the term ‘fight against terrorism’ as opposed to Bush administration’s policy of war against terrorism.
However these disagreements did not prevent EU-US taking a number of common measures on homeland security and counter terrorism also they continue to cooperate in Afghanistan. But the tension between EU and US rapidly increased by the President Bush unilateral decision of invasion of Iraq. In general EU-US relations can be defined as uneasy and combative during 2002 and 2003.
In 2004 with a newly elected European Parliament (the Barroso Commission) and with the re-election of George W. Bush, an opportunity arose to revise the transatlantic agenda. The progress in transatlantic relations started to increase with the EU-US Summit in 2006, in Vienna. President Bush remarked that “what is past is past, what is ahead of US is a hopeful democracy in Middle East”, confronting global challenges, energy security, economic and trade issues were dealt with constructively. At the end of the summit President Bush said that “we disagreed in an agreeable way” about the consultation between EU and US.10 As President Bush mentioned, there was progress in transatlantic relations, however there still remained disagreements between parties.
Transatlantic relations profoundly started to change with the election of Barak Obama as US President. Thereby, his election ushered a new era in relations with the EU.
3- The New Administration of President Obama and EU
Robert Kagan argues that “on major strategic and international questions, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less.” When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, and fashioning foreign and defense policies, Kagan claims that “the United States and Europe had irrevocably parted ways.”11
This understanding of EU-US relations started to change with the new US president. The new administration under President Obama started to seek for closer relations with EU in many areas. As opposed to former President Bush’s unilateral acts in international relations, Obama preferred to act multilaterally and he mentioned that he gave importance to cooperation with European states in case of global threats; such as, terrorism, climate change, global financial crisis, stabilizing Afghanistan, the rise of China and India also proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Obama’s administration clearly declared that dialogue and cooperation between EU and US will promote peace, stability and democracy. Hence one can clearly say that EU-US relations had a positive, fresh start under the new administration of President Obama and the attitudes of Europeans towards US started to change extensively in a positive way with the new president.
France and US relations has a long history which is deeply embedded in the world war years and especially in the past war years. In the post war years, initially there was cooperation between two nations specifically in the economic field. US helped France via Marshall Plan (1947) for rebuilding the French economy. Later on cooperation between two nations went beyond the economic field and France became formal ally for US through North Atlantic treaty by this way there had been achieved also political cooperation.
Although both countries were against Soviet Union’s aggression during the cold war, they went through a crisis in Suez (1956) which gave rise to emerging distrust between both. In general despite of some occasional tensions and conflicts between two nations, during the 1950’s, France had a positive opinion about US. The situation was drastically changed when Charles de Gaulle became the president of France and wanted to develop independent nuclear weapons. These tensions between US and France reached a peak in 1966, and De Gaulle decided to withdraw French forces from military structure of NATO. De Gaulle’s ambition was to make France a leading power with a large following among non-aligned Third countries especially Africa and Middle East.
The tension between France and US also continued during the Vietnam War and with the Algerian War of Independence. The French view of US further worsened as it became to be seen as an imperialist power.
France which is one of the founder countries of EU has seen EU as a mean for counter balancing American power. Hence France supported EU initiatives of currency of Euro which challenged US currency dollar in global trade and also France support European defense initiatives as an alternative to NATO for challenging American power.
In the post 9/11 era, France cooperated with US for fighting against terrorism by creating alliance between US and France intelligence service. French opposition to American power strengthened during the time of Iraq war. France along with other European countries and with Russia was against UN resolution which permits US invasion of Iraq in 2003. France severely criticized the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq.
Later on issues like Hezbollah power in Lebanon, Iran’s nuclear program and Israel Palestinian peace process gave rise to world leaders including France and US to fight against extremism in 2006. This decision was followed by strong France and US cooperation in UN during the Cedar Revolution and also two nations had an important role on UN resolution which aimed to bring a ceasefire in 2006 in Israel-Lebanon conflict.
Relations between France and US became much friendlier when pro American politician Nicolas Sarkozy elected as president in France in 2007.12 Sarkozy gave a speech before US Congress when he became president and he emphasized strong American French friendship. This close and friendly relations with US had some reflections also in EU. Especially in the time of French EU Presidency which was held by Nicolas Sarkozy in second half of 2008.
FRENCH EU PRESIDENCY and TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
French EU Presidency started with serious challenges. The first challenge that French EU Presidency faced was the rejection of Lisbon Treaty (2007) by the Ireland. Ireland was the only member of EU that left the ratification process in the hands of its citizens by holding a referendum on the proposal of Lisbon Treaty. Irish voters basically opposed to provisions of the treaty. Because they believe that Lisbon Treaty would defeat the rights of smaller member states to make their own laws and decide their own future. This development also had severe impacts on Czech Republic’s decision because Czech Republic was also opposed Lisbon Treaty and haven’t ratified it yet. EU Presidency took some measures (like offering guarantees on national sovereignty and each country continue to have a commissioner) to remove obstacles before the Lisbon Treaty and achieved to convince Ireland for having a second referendum. In this sense one could claim that French EU Presidency was successful about further integration within the union.
Another serious challenge that almost immediately after France took presidency was the war which broke out between Georgia and Russia because of the Georgian attacks on South Ossetia in 2008. EU cannot be considered totally unsuccessful in case of managing crisis in South Ossetia, actually EU succeeded in securing a ceasefire whereas US diplomacy was nowhere to be found. When Washington was grousing against Russia’s aggression, Sarkozy and his European colleagues were able to see that Georgia in fact was not that much blameless and Saakashvili made a huge mistake by attacking South Ossetia. “While mindful of the need to preserve a working relationship Moscow, Sarkozy is no apologist for Russia, but sees the country through the realist lens that is too often observed by ideological blinders on the other side of Atlantic .”13
The final significant challenge that French EU Presidency encountered was the global financial crisis which started with the bankruptcy of famous US firms and spread all around the world. When the financial crisis arose in US, Sarkozy took the initiative and convinced world leaders of all big economies and discussed possible resolutions for fighting against the global crisis in the G20 meeting in Washington.
Besides these challenges, to make an overall assessment of French EU Presidency and transatlantic relations, one should mention the areas that EU Presidency acted in a pro American way and the areas that presidency acted against America.
The election of Sarkozy as president in France was benchmark in case of France, EU and transatlantic relations because Sarkozy gave up 40 year old Gaullist, (anti American) tradition. By Sarkozy’s friendly attitude towards US, there existed rapprochement between EU-US during his presidency. France returned to the military structure of NATO in 2009 also Sarkozy aroused the EU to reinforce strategic partnership with NATO and cooperate in missions like Kosovo and Afghanistan.14
Although these close relations and cooperation between EU-US, there were still areas of conflict between two. Especially the climate change which is one of the priorities of French EU Presidency was a source of conflict between US and EU also the Iraq war in 2003 still existed as a thorn in their relationships. In addition to that Sarkozy blames US for not combating financial crisis efficiently enough. Another conflict between EU-US was in the field of military. Despite France’s involvement with NATO, it still wanted a developing European Defense and Security Policy.15 Hence Sarkozy wanted US recognition of European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) in exchange for France rejoining NATO’s military structure in April 2008.
If one wants to make an overall assessment about EU-US relations during French EU Presidency, one can say that it was one of the most proactive presidencies of its history and close relations with US thanks to giving up the Gaullist tradition. However, in some areas France still stuck to the old Europe tradition and in that area there are still tensions.
Czech Republic- US Relations
Historically there has been close relationship between Americans and Czechs. A large proportion of the population in US has acute cultural familial ties with the Czech nation. In the post world war era US President Woodrow Wilson and US played significant role in the establishment of Czechoslovakia. Wilson’s 14 points which included the right of self determination for any ethnic group were effective for the formation of Czechoslovakia in 1918.
In addition to that in the process of forming the basis of new state, the Czech president got help from US officials more specifically Czechoslovakia took US Constitution as a sample in preparing its own constitution. After the Second World War, normal relations between US and Czechoslovakia continued until 1948. In 1948 communists took power in Czechoslovakia and relations with US started to freeze. Later in 1968 Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia and it caused a complete rupture in relations with US. US took some steps removing invasion of Czechoslovakia by urging United Nations Security Council (UNSC) about the violation of UN Charter. However no action was taken against Soviet Union.
Since the Velvet Revolution of 1989, bilateral relation between US and Czechoslovakia improved rapidly. In 1990, US declared its support for building a democratic Czechoslovakia and the US government strongly encouraged economic and political transformation in Czechoslovakia.16
Although the US government initially was against the idea of forming two separate states because separation may create regional political tensions, US recognized both Slovakia and Czech Republic and from that time on US Czech relations stayed strong economically, culturally and politically.
In recent years relations between two countries improved more and they actually became strong allies of each other. Especially in 2003 Czech Republic gave support US led invasion of Iraq by sending chemical weapon warfare experts to Kuwait. Although there was strong governmental support for war, the majority of the Czech population was against the Iraq war according to the public opinion polls. But this opposition did not led to big demonstrations against war in Czech Republic.
Another current event that affected public opinion against US was about missile defense system. In 2008, Czech Security Information Service declared that Russian secret agents highly have been affecting public opinion against the forming of US radar in Czech Republic. In addition to that Stritecky claims that “the reaction of Czech government to Georgian crisis in 2008 suggested that the US presence in European security setup is still welcome also it serves as a balancer to growing Russian influence and mitigates the position of some European powers, which are often viewed as too pragmatic in relation to Russia.”17
CZECH EU PRESIDENCY and TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
In the first half of the 2009, Czech Republic inherited the EU Presidency from France. The Czech EU Presidency declared their priorities as economy, energy and EU in the world, also its motto is a “Europe without barriers.”18 If one would like to evaluate Czech EU Presidency in terms of transatlantic relations especially relations with US, it should be mentioned that transatlantic relations was the top foreign policy priorities of Czech EU Presidency.
Dialogue between the new US administration under Obama and EU under Czech Presidency was successfully established. In February 2009 an informal meeting of EU and US took place in Prague. The content of the meeting was issues of cooperation between EU-US and also the objective of the meeting was to make preparation for the EU-US Troika meeting.
On April 5th, an EU-US summit was held in Prague. President Obama announced, “We are here today because twenty years ago, the people of this city took the streets to claim the promise of a new day, and fundamental human rights that had been denied to them for too long. The Velvet Revolution taught us many things. It shows us that small countries can play a pivotal role in world events, and that young people can lead the way in overcoming old conflicts and it proved that moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon.”19 This part of the speech shows the historically close relations between Czechs and Americans also gives the opportunity of building closer cooperation between US and EU under Czech Presidency. In the summit both parties addressed the issues such as transatlantic relations, global financial crisis, cooperation on energy, security, climate change and international affairs. According to Turkish Weekly Journal this meeting was important because the meeting provided another opportunity for leaders across the Atlantic to listen to each other following the G20 financial summit in London.
Finally US-EU Ministerial Troika was held in 28th of April in Prague during the Czech EU Presidency. Many important topics were addressed by the parties, these were mainly new transatlantic relations, fight against terrorism, border protection, protection of children and exchange of data. In the meeting EU accepted the significance of US as a strategic partner in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs.
In general when evaluating about the Czech EU Presidency and its transatlantic relations, specifically relations with US, it is obvious that there were close relations and cooperation between the parties. In this cooperation, of course historically the relations of Czechs and US played an important role. Czech Republic as a member of new Europe had always good relations with US and Czechs feel much more secure under the US protective umbrella against Russia. Hence EU’s transatlantic relations under Czech Presidency was one of the top foreign policy priorities which was maintained successfully.
Sweden and US have strong ties since 18th century. Sweden was the first country which did not involve American Revolutionary War and recognized the newly established American Republic. From 1968 to 1976, relations between US and Sweden cooled mainly because of the strong opposition of Swedish government to US led Vietnam War. In 1972 diplomatic relations completely frozen due to speech of Swedish Prime Minister in the national radio in which he called US bombings in Vietnam as one of the biggest atrocities committed by Nazis.20
After 1966 due to the change of Swedish Prime Minister, relations between Sweden and US started to improve rapidly. Many diplomatic visits had taken place between two countries at governmental level. In the last decade, relations furthered especially after 9/11 attacks, Swedish government expressed its boost to US and encouraged US led invasion of Afghanistan. Whereas Sweden completely opposed the invasion of Iraq on 2003, like many other European states due to the fact that the invasion was a breach of international law.
In 2006, a new center right Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt seized in power and his party –Moderate Party- is more pro-American according to social democrats. They supported US invasion of Iraq and also supported the accession of Sweden into NATO membership. When Fredrik Reinfeldt became Prime Minister, he declared that they will work for strong transatlantic relations.
Besides the Swedish opposition to Iraq War, there are other areas of disagreement such as American detention policy at Guantanamo Bay and more significantly US opposition to sign Kyoto Protocol and the practices of death penalty.
SWEDISH EU PRESIDENCY and TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
In the second half of the 2009 beginning with July, Sweden started to hold EU Presidency. The main objective of Swedish EU Presidency is to establish strong and effective Europe by sharing common responsibility for resisting the challenges of today and tomorrow. Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt expresses EU Presidency’s priorities by saying “The EU is facing a crucial period. Together we must deal with the economic crisis and unemployment, but also unite the world to tackle climate change. The Swedish Presidency is ready to take on the challenge. “21
Swedish EU Presidency priorities such as dealing with climate change and global financial crisis are important in case of EU and transatlantic relations. In the current EU agenda, Presidency mentions that EU will try to find new prospects for deeper transatlantic dialogue and also believes that EU’s role in Middle East should be developed. In this respect the most recent event that took place between US and EU was EU-US Summit on 4th of November in Washington. With the new Obama administration, there are attempts by the EU toward US to restart transatlantic relations. This summit was the first official EU-US summit since president Obama took the office.
The President of European Council, the Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt together with the president of European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and the high representative of European Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana went Washington to discuss solutions for fighting climate change with Obama. Also EU representatives visited US to submit their new Plan for Action in Afghanistan. However EU representatives could not achieve their ambitions and the summit ended with a 15 page declaration which involves a review of all transatlantic initiatives and common action.22
On the most important and urgent topic of the summit, climate change, the EU failed to get any concessions from the US. However after the summit Barroso said that “Regarding climate change, I want to say that I’m more confident now than I was some days before.” And he added that “as I said earlier President Obama changed the climate on the climate change negotiations because with the strong leadership of US we can indeed reach an agreement.”23
Ahto Lobjakas says in his article called –Lackluster EU-US Summit Highlights Lack of Strategic Depth in Relationship- that actually on the same day of the summit EU had disappointed because democratic majority decided to bind discussions about climate change bill for 5 weeks. Hence this event caused EU representatives to lose their last hope about reaching a global binding agreement about reducing greenhouse gas emissions at Copenhagen Summit in 7th of December 2009.
Barroso himself previously mentioned that without US there will be no agreement on climate change because if US does not accept the agreement, it will be almost impossible for EU to sanctify agreement on emissions of greenhouse gases.
With regard to other top issues of summit Afghanistan which is the most urgent global priority for US, Obama appreciated EU’s effort in Afghanistan and demanded from EU to continue with its active role in the region. However none of the European countries ready to increase its military existence in the region. Barroso also made a statement about this issue and he said “no great enthusiasm among the public in Europe to send more forces.” As opposed to US desires about European military presence in Afghanistan, EU just before the EU-US summit seized upon a declaration which promises assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan for strengthening civilian authorities.24
Besides these unresolved issues, there was something new that emerged from the summit which is a mutual EU-US Energy Council on ministerial level. The main objective of this structure is to develop energy security and by this way make contributions to achieving ambitions about climate change. The main responsibility of the Council will be to focus on diversification of energy sources and also help EU in case of how to create global energy security on the basis of stable, transparent energy markets and diversified energy sources.
Adelina Marini expressed her views about the result of this summit as “although the declaration is nothing more than a political statement of good will, indeed it is a very important signal toward the international community, because it says that the EU and US – especially US – will not approach any of the above mentioned issues unilaterally.”25
Hence one can say that EU-US relations under Swedish EU Presidency is active but still relations are dominated by US decisions especially in case of climate change issue one cannot say that the EU has been successful. However in case of Afghanistan, the EU is determined about using civilian power rather than hard power, which is supported and desired by the Obama administration.
This research approved the dominant perspective on rotating EU Presidencies give priority to their own national interests in the presidency agenda as it is observed in the cases of the presidencies of France, Czech Republic and Sweden. In the cases of the small states of Europe, the EU gives them the opportunity of evolving their national cultures and growing without threat under EU umbrella. For small states of the EU like Czech Republic and Sweden, the Union has been a way of playing a role and exercising influence that they could not otherwise able to perform. Sweden defined itself as neutral during the Cold War. In the post war era Sweden found itself without a role in international political arena then it turned to Europe to get a role for itself. Hence EU is an opportunity for small states like Sweden to gain a role and became effective in international arena. In addition to that the historical relations of each country with US and the attitude of president of each country towards US are effective in transatlantic relations. As it is observed in France which is traditionally Gaullist but with the new French administration under President Sarkozy who is pro-American, transatlantic relations gained progress rapidly. In case of Czech Republic which can be defined as ‘new Europe’, became member in 2004 and it is famous with its historically closer relations with US, under Czech EU Presidency these historical background was effective in transatlantic relations. Finally in case of Sweden, transatlantic relations were given weight thanks to new US administration under President Obama who is much more in the favor of multilateral relations, using soft power in international conflicts and has more moderate approach in case of taking precautions against global climate change as opposed to former US President Bush’s unilateral and hard power based politics. In this respect, it is hoped that the relations between EU and US will grow rapidly in a constructive manner under the Obama administration.
BARROSO Jose Manuel, Brussels, 9 February2005, Press Release.
BINDI Federiga and KUPCHAN Charles, “ Sarkozy’s Europe is Good For Obama”,
The New York Times, 14 Janurary 2009.
BURGHARDT Gunter, “ The European Union’s Transatlantic Relationship”,
College of Europe EU Diplomacy Papers, No.2, 2006, p. 2-25.
BUSH George W. , Vienna, 21 June 2006, Press Release.
Czech Presidency of the European Union, Presidency Motto,
23 December 2008,
<http://www.eu2009.cz/en/czech-presidency/presidency-motto/presidencey-motto-482/> (15 December 2009).
Embassy of The United States Czech Republic, Remarks of President Obama,
5 April 2009,<http://pragueusembassy.gov/obama.html > (28 November 2009).
Embassy of the United States Czech Repulic, Ambassador Remarks,
8 June 2007 <http://prague.usembassy.gov/sp070608_uscz.html> (23 December 2009).
France Diplomatie, Country Files, United States,
21 July 2009, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/united-states_425/index.html>, (12 December 2009).
FRASER Cameron, Introduction to European Foreign Policy,
New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 90-106.
KAGAN Robert, “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World
Order”, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, p.50.
LOBJAKAS Ahto, “Lackluster EU-US Summit Highlights Lack of Strategic Depth in
Relationship”, 4 November 2009.
<http://www.rferl.org/content/Lackluster_Summit_Highlights_Lack_Of Depth_In_Relationship/1869548.html > ( 10 Janurary 2010).
MARINI Adelina, “ An Attempt to Restart Transatlantic Relations”, 4 November 2009,
<http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/an-attempt-for-restart-of-transatlantic-relations/ > (20 November 2009)
MUTUS Ceren, “ An Overall Assesment of the French EU Presidency”,
8 Janurary 2009, <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=817 > (19 December 2009).
STRITECKY Vit, “ Transatlantic relations 2009: European Expectations for the
Post-Bush Era, Czech Republic”, European Policy Institutes Network, No.20, 2008, p.4.
Swedish Presidency of The European Union, The Presidency,
12 September 2009, <http://www.se2009.eu>, (23 November 2009).
US Department of State, Background Note: Sweden,
March 2009,<http://www.state.gov7r/pa/ei/bgn/2880.html> (20 Janurary 2010).
1 Barroso Jose Manuel, Brussels, 9February 2005, Press Release.
2 Burghardt Gunter, “ The European Union’s Transatlantic Relationship”, College of Europe EU Diplomacy Papers, No.2, 2006, p.2-25.
3 Fraser Cameron, Introduction European Foreign Policy, New York, Routledge, 2007, p.90-106.
4 Burghardt Gunter, op cit., p.5.
5 Burghardt Gunter, op cit., p.6.
6 Burghardt Gunter, op cit., p.7
7 Burghardt Gunter, op cit., p.9
8 Fraser Cameron, op cit., p.92
9 Burghardt Guunter, op cit., p.13
10 Bush W. George, Vienna, 21 June 2006, Press Release.
11 Kagan Robert, “ Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order”, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, p.50.
12 France Diplomatie, Country Files, United States, 21 July 2009, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/united-states_425/index.html>, (12 December 2009).
13 Bindi Federiga and Kupchan Charles, “ Sarkozy’s Europe is Good For Obama”, The New York Times, 14 Janurary 2009.
14Mutus Ceren, “ An Overall Assesment of the French EU Presidency”, 8 Janurary 2009, <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=817 > (19 December 2009).
15 Mutus Ceren, Ibid.
16 Embassy of the United States Czech Repulic, Ambassador Remarks, 8 June 2007 <http://prague.usembassy.gov/sp070608_uscz.html> (23 December 2009).
17 Stritecky Vit, “Transatlantic relations 2009: European Expectations for the Post-Bush Era, Czech Republic”, European Policy Institutes Network, No.20, 2008, p.4.
18 Czech Presidency of the European Union, Presidency Motto, 23 December 2008,
(15 December 2009).
19 Embassy of The United States Czech Republic, Remarks of President Obama, Ibid.
20 US Department of State, Background Note: Sweden, March 2009,
<http://www.state.gov7r/pa/ei/bgn/2880.html> (20 Janurary 2010).
21 Swedish Presidency of The European Union, The Presidency, 12 September 2009,
<http://www.se2009.eu>, (23 November 2009).
22 Marini Adelina, “ An Attempt to Restart Transatlantic Relations”, 4 November 2009, <http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/an-attempt-for-restart-of-transatlantic-relations/ >
(20 November 2009).
23 Lobjakas Ahto, “Lackluster EU-US Summit Highlights Lack of Strategic Depth in Relationship”, November 4, 2009, <http://www.rferl.org/content/Lackluster_Summit_Highlights_Lack_Of_Strategic_Depth_In_Relationship/1869548.html > ( 10 Janurary 2010)
24 Lobjakas Ahto,Ibid.
25 Marini Adelina, Ibid.
Written by: Dilek Morgul
Written at: Koc University
Written for: Dr. Bahar Rumelili
Date Written: 20 December 2009